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Abstract
We compare adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly
game in which a home and foreign ®rm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers,
each ®rm bene®ts from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export
subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly
effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may
yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though
quali®cations to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
Keywords: R&D spillovers; R&D cooperative agreements; RJVs (research joint ventures);
strategic trade policy; export subsidies
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I. Introduction
Governments everywhere see international success for domestic high-tech-
nology ®rms as a desirable objective and measures to encourage such ®rms
as an important component of economic policy. While this perspective
suggests adopting an adversarial approach to promoting `` national cham-
pions'', governments are also aware of the potential bene®ts to home ®rms
of cooperative arrangements such as research joint ventures with foreign
®rms. Finally, both domestic governments and international regulatory
bodies (such as the EU Commission) are increasingly conscious of the need
Scand. J. of Economics 101(4), 577±596, 1999
# The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road,
Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
We are very grateful to Bruno Cassiman, Dermot Leahy, Ian Wooton, three anonymous
referees and participants at the Irish Economic Association Annual Conference, 1996, at a
CEPR Conference on Competition and Trade Policy, Barcelona, December 1997, at the
Conference on Competition and Industrial Policies in Open Economies in Bergen, May 1998,
and at EEA 98 in Berlin for helpful comments. Neary's work forms part of the International
Economic Performance Programme of the Centre for Economic Performance, London School
of Economics, supported by the UK SSRC. This research was undertaken with support from
the European Union Phare ACE Programme contract no. P96-6092-R and was written while
O'Sullivan was a Lecturer at National University of Ireland, Maynooth. An earlier version was
circulated as CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1916.
to formulate and enforce guidelines for pro-competitive behaviour at the
international as well as at the national level.
Developing an analytical framework to deal with these issues poses
formidable challenges. At the very least, it requires the application of a
number of sub-disciplines in economics, drawing on work in the ®elds of
industrial and trade policy, technology policy and competition policy. In this
paper we take a small step in this direction by combining the insights from
two strands of recent literature, the theory of strategic trade policy, asso-
ciated especially with Brander and Spencer (1985), and the analysis of R&D
cooperation in oligopolistic markets pioneered by d'Aspremont and Jacque-
min (1988). In particular, we try to throw light on the relative merits of
adversarial and cooperative approaches. From the perspective of domestic
welfare, should governments encourage home ®rms to adopt a `` beat 'em'' or
a `` join 'em'' approach to foreign rivals?
The theory of strategic trade policy has shown that intervention in
oligopolistic markets can raise domestic welfare if governments use their
superior commitment powers to `` shift pro®ts'' towards home ®rms. The
limitations of the theory's interventionist thrust have been well documented:
in particular, subsidies are justi®ed when ®rms engage in quantity competi-
tion but not in price competition, and foreign retaliation leads to a prisoners'
dilemma from which both governments are likely to lose; see Brander
(1995) for references. Nevertheless it constitutes one of the few strictly
economic justi®cations for policy activism. However, the merits of subsidis-
ing exporting ®rms have to be re-examined in the light of two key considera-
tions in the recent literature. First, a number of authors have noted that the
bene®ts of strategic intervention may be reduced if the government cannot
commit in advance to its policy. Second, the bene®ts of adversarial policies
need to be reconsidered in the light of the potential gains from cooperation
between ®rms. While the effects of R&D cooperation in the presence of
R&D spillovers have been extensively studied in a closed-economy context,
its implications in open economies have been little studied as yet.1 The
contribution of this paper is to extend the analysis of international research
joint ventures to allow for asymmetries between ®rms and to compare
cooperation with free trade and export subsidisation both in general and for
speci®c functional forms.
We do this in a canonical model which is introduced in Section II. This
1Strategic policy with imperfect government commitment has been explored by Maskin and
Newbery (1990), Goldberg (1995), Karp and Perloff (1995), O'Sullivan (1995) and Leahy and
Neary (1999b). Guffens (1995), Motta (1996), Muniagurria and Singh (1997), Qiu and Tao
(1998) and Leahy and Neary (1999a) have studied R&D spillovers in open economies. None
of these papers considers the general asymmetric case studied here, or compares international
R&D cooperation with export subsidies within a common framework.
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abstracts from issues of domestic competition policy by assuming a duopo-
listic market in which a single home ®rm competes with a foreign rival and
all output is exported. We also consider a restricted range of policies,
ignoring direct subsidies to R&D and assuming (plausibly) that export
subsidies are not provided if ®rms cooperate on R&D. We look at the
incentives ®rms face to invest in R&D with and without R&D cooperation in
Section III, and the role of export subsidies with and without government
commitment in Section IV. Welfare levels between the four equilibria are
compared in Section V and Section VI shows how the comparison is
facilitated when special functional forms are assumed.2
II. The Model
We consider a two-period Cournot duopoly model, in which a home and a
foreign ®rm export a homogeneous commodity to a third country which
consumes all of the good. Period 1 is the pre-market R&D phase and period
2 is the output phase. The home and foreign ®rms choose R&D levels x and
x, respectively, in period 1 and produce output levels q and q, respectively,
in period 2. R&D incurs up-front costs in period 1 given by Ã(x) and Ã(x)
for the home and foreign ®rm, respectively. The bene®ts come in the form of
lower marginal costs in period 2 (assumed independent of the level of
output), but not all the bene®ts accrue to the ®rm which carries out the
R&D:
c  c(x, x), cx  ÿè, cx  ÿâè
c  c(x, x), cx  ÿè, cx  ÿâè:
(1)
Here è and è measure the effectiveness of each ®rm's R&D in reducing its
own costs; and â and â (which lie between 0 and 1) measure the extent to
which R&D has bene®cial spillover effects on the rival ®rm's costs. The
inverse demand function is given by
p  p(q q), p9  ÿb, (q q) p 0=p9  r, (2)
where b is the slope of the demand function and r is a measure of the
concavity of demand. (Note we do not assume that any of the parameters è,
è, â, â, b or r, are constant.)
Summing costs and sales revenue and adding any export subsidy payments
received (where s is the per unit subsidy) gives the pro®ts of the home ®rm:
2A longer version of the paper (giving the derivations in detail) and the GAUSS program
which generates the ®gures, are available on request.
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ð  f p(q q)ÿ c(x, x) sgqÿ Ã(x): (3)
The foreign ®rm's pro®ts ð are determined similarly, except that it receives
no subsidies. Finally, with no home consumption, national welfare equals
pro®ts net of subsidy payments:
W  ðÿ sq  ( pÿ c)qÿ Ã(x): (4)
In all the games we consider, the two ®rms engage in Cournot product-
market competition in period 2. Hence, with production costs determined by
past decisions on R&D, output levels are determined by the home and
foreign ®rms' ®rst-order conditions:
ðq  pÿ c sÿ bq  0;
ðq  pÿ c ÿ bq  0:
(5)
We consider four distinct games, in each of which the solution concept is
subgame perfection (so at each stage, agents take account of how their
current decisions affect the future decisions of all other agents). The games
differ in whether or not ®rms cooperate in their choice of R&D and whether
or not the home government offers an export subsidy and can commit to it in
advance of ®rms' R&D decisions:
(i) Game F: Free trade, with no cooperation on R&D. In this benchmark
two-stage game, ®rms choose R&D levels in period 1 and outputs in period 2.
(ii) Game C: Free trade, with cooperation on R&D. The move order is the
same as in Game F. The difference is that ®rms cooperate in their choice of
R&D so as to maximise the sum of their joint pro®ts. However, outputs in
period 2 are still chosen in a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash manner. This
game has been extensively examined in a closed-economy context, stem-
ming from the work of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
(iii) Game G: Government commitment to an export subsidy. In this three-
stage game, ®rst studied by Spencer and Brander (1983), the government
chooses the subsidy to maximise domestic welfare (4), setting s before the
®rms' choice of both R&D and exports.
(iv) Game S: Subsidisation without commitment. In this game the govern-
ment also provides an export subsidy to maximise (4) but, unlike Game G, it
cannot commit to the subsidy level before ®rms choose their R&D levels. In
this three-stage game, ®rms ®rst choose their R&D levels, then the govern-
ment chooses its subsidy, and ®nally ®rms choose their output levels. This
game has been considered by Karp and Perloff (1995), O'Sullivan (1995)
and Grossman and Maggi (1998).
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III. Strategic Investment with and without Cooperation on
R&D
We consider ®rst the two games where the home government does not
intervene. In choosing its optimal level of R&D, each ®rm takes account of
the direct cost-reducing effect and also of the strategic effect of R&D on its
rival's output in the second stage. Thus, in Game F (the benchmark free-trade
game with no cooperation on R&D) the home ®rm's ®rst-order condition for
R&D is:
dð
dx
 ðx  ðq dq

dx
 0: (6)
Here the direct or non-strategic effect of R&D, ðx, equals èqÿ Ã9, i.e., the
gain from a reduction in the ®rm's production costs less the direct cost of the
R&D itself. When this effect is zero, R&D is at its ef®cient level from the
home country's perspective. Hence there is over- or under-investment in
R&D depending on whether the second term on the RHS is positive or
negative. Since the home ®rm unambiguously gains from a fall in foreign
output (ðq  ÿbq , 0), the sign of the second term depends on whether
additional home R&D lowers or raises foreign output. This in turn depends
on the following:
b
dq
dx
 ÿá(âÿ â)è, á. 0, â  èð

qq
èðqq
, (7)
where the threshold parameter â is positive provided foreign output is a
strategic substitute for domestic output (i.e., ðqq , 0). (Strategic substitut-
ability, equivalent to downward-sloping reaction functions, is the normal
con®guration in Cournot competition. We assume it holds henceforward.)
Substituting into (6) we obtain:
dð
dx
 ìFqÿ Ã9  0, where ìF  [1 á(âÿ â)]è: (8)
ìF is the marginal return to R&D per unit of output in free trade.3 Equations
3To derive (7), totally differentiate (5). The parameter á equals ÿbèðqq=èÄ and must be
positive since ðqq , 0 from the home ®rm's second-order condition and Ä, the determinant of
the coef®cient matrix, is positive from stability of the period-2 subgame. â can also be written
as è(1 ó r)=è(2 ó r), where ó and ó are the home and foreign market shares,
respectively. This implies that â is greater than è=2è if and only if (2ÿ 3ó )r . 0; i.e., if and
only if either the home ®rm's market share is less than 2
3
and demand is concave (r . 0), or the
converse. In the linear symmetric case considered by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988),
è  è, ó  ó  1
2
and r  0, and so the threshold value equals 1
2
.
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(7) and (8) show that, with low spillovers (â, â), higher home R&D
lowers foreign output and so the home ®rm has an incentive to over-invest in
R&D (ìF .è). Conversely, with high spillovers (â. â), higher home
R&D raises foreign output and so the home ®rm has an incentive to under-
invest in R&D (ìF ,è). Since the foreign ®rm faces identical incentives, we
may conclude that both ®rms invest more, the lower the spillover parameters
â and â.4
The incentives to invest in R&D are very different in Game C when
cooperation by ®rms leads each of them to choose its R&D so as to
maximise their joint pro®ts. The home ®rm's ®rst-order condition for R&D
is now:
d(ð ð)
dx
 ðx  ðq dq

dx
 
 ðx  ðq
dq
dx
 
 0: (9)
This takes account of both direct and strategic effects on foreign as well as
home pro®ts. Similar calculations to those already given for the no-coopera-
tion game show that:
d(ð ð)
dx
 ìCqÿ Ã9  0, where ìC  öè ö9âè, (10)
and both ö and ö9 are presumptively positive.5 Now, the marginal return to
R&D and hence the level of investment is typically increasing in the
spillover parameter â. However, it is not true that cooperation fully
internalises the externality arising from R&D spillovers. Because of strategic
behaviour the ®rm may either under- or over-invest in R&D from a national
point of view. For low spillovers the ®nal strategic term in (9), ðq dq=dx, is
negative and ensures that the ®rm under-invests in R&D (ìC , è).
Will cooperation lead to more or less investment than non-cooperation?
To answer this, we need only compare the two marginal return to R&D
parameters, ìC and ìF:
4This and subsequent comparisons are exact with no further quali®cations when the parameters
è, â and â are constants. More generally, the values of the two marginal returns to R&D may
differ between any two equilibria to be compared. From Leahy and Neary (1997, Section II.B),
suf®cient conditions to justify such comparisons are that equilibrium of each type is unique
and that appropriate stability conditions hold.
5They equal: ö  1ÿ fðqq ÿ (ó=ó )ðqqgb=Ä  [2(2ÿ 3ó) f1ÿ 2(ó)2gr]b2=óÄ
and ö9  ó=ó ÿ f(ó=ó )ðqq ÿ ðqqgb=Ä  [2(2ÿ 3ó ) (1ÿ 2ó 2)r]b2=óÄ. This implies
that a suf®cient condition for both ö. 0 and ö9 , ó=ó is that ó > 1
2
, while if demands are
linear, a necessary and suf®cient condition for these two outcomes is that ó . 1
3
. Symmetri-
cally, a suf®cient condition for both ö, 1 and ö9 . 0 is that ó < 1
2
, while if demands are
linear, a necessary and suf®cient condition for these two outcomes is that ó , 2
3
.
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ìC ÿ ìF  á9(â ÿ â9)è, á9 . 0, â9  è
è
ðqq
ð
qq  2ðqq
: (11)
Thus cooperation leads to more R&D if â exceeds a new threshold, â9,
which is positive provided domestic output is a strategic substitute for
foreign output (i.e., ðqq , 0).6
The ®nal question to be addressed is whether cooperation raises welfare.
Since we have assumed, following the strategic trade policy literature, that
all output is exported, and since both Games F and C are free-trade
equilibria, welfare and home pro®ts coincide.7 Moreover, home pro®ts must
be at least as great with cooperation as without, since the aggregate pro®ts of
the two ®rms are maximised in the former case. Cooperation must lead to
higher pro®ts unless the two equilibria coincide, which occurs when the
spillover parameter â equals the threshold â9 given in (11).
IV. Export Subsidies with and without Government
Commitment
We turn next to equilibria with government intervention. In Game G, where
the government can commit to its export subsidy prior to decisions on R&D,
the behaviour of ®rms is the same as in the non-cooperative free-trade game
of the last section. Anticipating this behaviour, the government in the ®rst
stage chooses the export subsidy to maximise welfare, given by equation (4).
To see the implications of this, totally differentiate (4):
dW  ÿs dqÿ bq dq  (èÿ ìF)q dx âèq dx: (12)
The ®rst two terms on the RHS are standard. The ®rst re¯ects the deadweight
loss from increased exports when a subsidy is in place, while the second
re¯ects the rent-shifting gain in welfare, as the foreign ®rm is pushed down
its reaction function. The other two terms are less familiar. The term in dx
re¯ects the divergence between marginal social and private returns to R&D.
6As with (7), we make use of the fact that ð
qq , 0 from the foreign ®rm's second-order
condition. á9 equals ÿ(ð
qq  2ðqq )ó b=óÄ, which is positive. â9 can also be written as
è(2 ó r)=è[4 (1 ó )r], implying that â9 is greater than è=2è if and only if
(1ÿ 3ó )r . 0; i.e., if and only if either the home ®rm's market share is greater than 1
3
and
demand is concave (r . 0), or the converse. As with â, the threshold value reduces to 1
2
in the
linear symmetric case.
7If instead we take a world welfare perspective, then the closed-economy results of Leahy and
Neary (1997) apply. In particular, with low spillovers, the reduction in output brought about by
R&D cooperation reduces consumer surplus to such an extent that total welfare (pro®ts plus
consumer surplus) is lower than without cooperation. Moreover, a cooperative typically under-
invests in R&D for all â: because of the strategic effects in (9), ìC is likely to be less than
è âè, which is the marginal world social return to domestic R&D.
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When these differ, there is a motive for subsidisation to offset the inef®cient
investment which the home ®rm carries out for purely strategic reasons. Of
course, this term can be either positive or negative: when spillovers are low,
the home ®rm over-invests strategically so an offsetting tax is warranted, and
conversely when spillovers are high. Finally, the fourth term re¯ects inter-
temporal rent-shifting, as opposed to the conventional intra-temporal kind
represented by the second term. When spillovers are strictly positive, home
pro®ts and welfare are directly affected by foreign R&D. Assuming (plau-
sibly) that foreign R&D depends negatively on s, this term tends to
encourage an export tax: government commitment to an export tax raises
foreign R&D and so (because of spillovers) brings about a rise in pro®ts that
the home ®rm cannot credibly attain by itself.
While interpreting the terms in (12) is insightful, not much more can be
said about their net impact on the sign of the optimal subsidy at this level of
generality. The one thing we can be sure of is that the ability of the
government to commit to an export subsidy must increase welfare relative to
free trade. The situation is very different in Game S, when the government
cannot commit to its subsidy level until after ®rms choose their R&D. It
therefore chooses the export subsidy to set to zero equation (12) without the
R&D terms. This leads to the static rent-shifting subsidy ®rst derived by
Brander and Spencer (1985):
s(x, x)  ÿbq dq

dq
, (13)
where dq=dq, the slope of the foreign ®rm's static reaction function, is
negative provided foreign output is a strategic substitute for domestic output.
We write the subsidy as a function of the two R&D levels, because they are
chosen prior to it. In the ®rst stage of the game, both ®rms anticipate this
dependence and take it into account in choosing their optimal R&D levels.
Thus the ®rst-order condition for home R&D is now:
dð
dx
 ðx  ðq dq

dx
 ðs @s
@x
 0: (14)
A higher subsidy must raise pro®ts (ðs  q . 0), so the impact of the
additional ®nal term on the marginal pro®tability of R&D hinges on the
effect of R&D on the optimal subsidy, @s=@x. Leahy and Neary (1999b)
derive a necessary and suf®cient condition for this term to be positive and
show that this is the normal case.8 Assuming for concreteness that this is so,
8Over-strong suf®cient conditions for @s=@x to be positive are that both the demand curve and
the foreign reaction function are non-convex. These conditions are satis®ed if demand is linear,
as in Section VI below.
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the home ®rm over-invests further in R&D. It does so both because R&D
directly raises the subsidy it will receive (as shown by the third term in (14))
but also because a positive value for @s=@x indirectly raises the effectiveness
of home R&D in lowering foreign output.9 Finally, the foreign ®rm faces a
similar incentive. Its ®rst-order condition is:
dð
dx  ð

x  ðq
dq
dx  0: (15)
Foreign pro®ts are not affected directly by changes in the home subsidy.
However, the magnitude of dq=dx depends on the responsiveness of the
subsidy to foreign R&D, @s=@x. Just as we would expect higher home
R&D to mandate a higher subsidy, so would we expect higher foreign R&D
to mandate a lower subsidy. This in turn makes it more likely that dq=dx
will be negative and so encourages over-investment by the foreign ®rm too.
What is the effect on welfare of these additional incentives to engage in
R&D which both ®rms face as a result of the endogeneity of the subsidy? In
general, we can be sure that in this model the government's inability to
commit cannot raise welfare relative to the commitment game and will lower
it if R&D has any effect on costs. We can say something further by
inspection of (12). The third term (substituting from (14) for the marginal
return to R&D in this game) shows that extra investment by the home ®rm
lowers welfare except when spillovers are high. As for extra investment by
the foreign ®rm, it has a direct effect tending to raise welfare, provided there
are positive spillovers. However, it also has an indirect effect on the location
of the foreign ®rm's period-2 reaction function. This effect tends to increase
foreign output and is not offset by the subsidy (which, from (13), only
neutralises the effects of foreign output changes along a given foreign
reaction function). Except for high spillovers this effect is likely to dominate,
thereby reducing home welfare further.
V. Comparing Welfare across Equilibria
The welfare results of the two previous sections may be summarised as
follows:
W C > W F , W G > W S : (16)
From Section III, cooperation cannot lower welfare relative to free trade and
9When s depends on x, the threshold parameter â in (7) becomes (è @s=@x)ð
qq=è
ðqq.
Thus a positive value for @s=@x makes dq=dx more likely to be negative and increases further
the incentive to invest in R&D.
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will raise it except when the spillover parameter â equals the threshold
value â9 given in equation (11). From Section IV, commitment to an optimal
export subsidy always raises welfare relative to free trade; and it raises
welfare relative to an optimal subsidy without commitment except when
R&D is ineffective (when the commitment issue is irrelevant).
These results are interesting but they leave open two crucial questions.
First, when will intervention without commitment raise welfare relative to
free trade? Clearly, if R&D is ineffective, there is no cost to the government's
inability to commit (W G  W S) and so W S exceeds W F. However, when
R&D is effective then, as Karp and Perloff (1995), O'Sullivan (1995) and
Grossman and Maggi (1998) have shown, over-investment by the home ®rm
with a view to manipulating the export subsidy can lower welfare relative to
free trade. Second, as posed in the paper's title, when will optimal interven-
tion raise welfare relative to international R&D cooperation? This in turn
implies two sub-questions, since intervention may be with or without
commitment. We can infer from (16) that intervention with commitment
dominates cooperation when â equals the threshold given in equation (11).
Moreover, intervention without commitment dominates cooperation when
R&D is ineffective.
VI. The Linear-Quadratic Case
To go beyond the weak suf®cient conditions discussed in the last section, we
simplify the model by assuming that ®rms are symmetric and that the
behavioural functions take special forms.10 Speci®cally, we assume that the
demand function is linear:
p(q q)  aÿ b(q q); (17)
that each ®rm's marginal production cost function is linear in its own and its
rival's R&D:
c(x, x)  c0 ÿ è(x âx) and c(x, x)  c0 ÿ è(x  âx); (18)
and that the R&D cost functions are quadratic in R&D:
Ã(x)  ãx2=2 and Ã(x)  ã(x)2=2: (19)
(All the parameters a, b, c0, è, â and ã are constant.) Fortunately, compari-
sons between the four games with symmetry depend on only two parameters:
10Asymmetries between ®rms in similar linear-quadratic models, but without spillovers, are
considered in Neary (1994), Karp and Perloff (1995) and Leahy and Neary (1999b).
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the degree of spillovers â and a new composite parameter ç, de®ned as
ç  è2=bã. Following Leahy and Neary (1996), this can be interpreted as
the relative effectiveness of R&D, since è gives the reduction in unit
production costs per unit of R&D, ã is the marginal cost of R&D and b (the
slope of the demand function) is a measure of the size of the market. Figures
1 to 5 compare the levels of welfare in each of the four games as functions
of ç and â (with the normalisation (aÿ c0)2  9b, so that welfare in free
trade is unity when ç is zero).
Figure 1 shows that welfare in free trade falls with ç in the absence of
spillovers, as additional strategic over-production bene®ts consumers at the
expense of ®rms.11 However, welfare rises with ç for moderate or high
11This was also noted in Leahy and Neary (1996, footnote 6). The explicit solutions are:
W F  9ÿ 2(2ÿ â)
2ç
[9ÿ 2(1 â)(2ÿ â)ç]2 and W
C  1
9ÿ 2(1 â)2ç :
Fig. 1. Welfare in free trade
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spillovers and (provided ç is strictly positive) always rises with â. (Though
recall from Section III that with higher spillovers ®rms engage in less R&D.)
Compare this with the level of welfare when ®rms cooperate on R&D, shown
in Figure 2. Now welfare rises with ç even with no spillovers. (Of course, in
this case, cooperation has no cost-saving implication and is purely a strategic
device which avoids over-investment and so leads to less R&D.) Welfare
rises even more rapidly when both parameters attain moderate or high levels,
reaching a value of 9.0 (truncated from the ®gure to facilitate presentation)
when both ç and â are unity.
We know from Section III that cooperation always raises welfare, except
when â attains its threshold level â (equal to 1
2
with linear demands).
Comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows in addition that the gains from
cooperation are increasing in ç and in the absolute gap between â and 1
2
.
Recall, however, that cooperation is preferable for very different reasons in
the low- and high-spillover cases. For low â, it allows the ®rms to reduce
Fig. 2. Welfare with cooperation on R&D
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their R&D and avoid strategic over-investment; whereas for high â it has the
more natural effect of increasing R&D, though still not to the ef®cient level
(from a world perspective).
Turning next to the two cases where the government intervenes to provide
an export subsidy (G and S), a complication arises. If R&D is even
moderately effective, the effect of the subsidy may be to drive the foreign
®rm from the market. For parameter values at which this happens, we
assume that the home government offers a subsidy just suf®cient to drive
foreign pro®ts to zero. In Game G, the government commits in advance of
R&D decisions to the entry-preventing subsidy. Moreover, for some para-
meter values an optimal rent-shifting equilibrium may exist, in which the
foreign ®rm earns strictly positive pro®ts, and yet entry prevention yields
higher welfare. The reason is that, with entry prevention, home investment in
R&D is always at the ef®cient level (de®ned by èq  Ã9), since, if the
foreign ®rm does not enter, the home ®rm has no strategic incentive to over-
invest.
The outcome of these considerations is the welfare function for Game G
shown in Figure 3. It is clearly the upper envelope of two single-peaked
functions.12 That covering the larger part of the parameter space corresponds
to the rent-shifting equilibrium. It starts at 1.125 ( 9=8) when there is no
R&D and increases relatively gently in both ç and â thereafter. The other
function corresponds to the entry-prevention equilibrium. It applies when
R&D is relatively effective (so subsidisation causes the home ®rm to expand
a lot and squeeze out foreign output) and spillovers are low (so the foreign
®rm does not bene®t from home R&D). It is clearly strongly increasing in ç
and decreasing in â.
We know from general principles that the welfare level attainable when
the government commits to a subsidy must exceed that in free trade.
However, comparing Figures 1 and 3, it is striking that the gains from an
optimal rent-shifting subsidy are relatively modest: 12.5% in the static case
when ç is zero, as we have seen, and even less when both ç and â are high.
By contrast, the gains from entry prevention (when ç is high and â is low)
are considerable. Figure 4 shows that entry prevention also leads to large
gains relative to cooperation. However, with rent shifting the gains are much
smaller and, when spillovers are high and R&D very effective, rent-shifting
is inferior to cooperation. This ®gure provides one answer to the question
posed in the title of the paper. Commitment dominates cooperation for most
parameter values, though only modestly except when it enables the home
government to deter entry by the foreign ®rm.
12The welfare level with rent shifting is too complex to evaluate explicitly. It is obtained by
substituting the optimal subsidy from footnote 15 below into the with-subsidy welfare function
W  (bqÿ s)qÿ ãx2=2. Welfare with entry prevention equals (1ÿ 2â)ç=2(1ÿ âç)2.
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Of course, the assumption that the government can commit in advance to
its export subsidy prejudices the comparison against cooperation. The story
is very different when the government cannot commit to its subsidy, as
illustrated in Figure 5. Once again, there is both a rent-shifting and an entry-
prevention regime. However, since the government moves second, it is
effectively the home ®rm which determines which regime prevails.13 As in
Game G, the rent-shifting regime prevails over most of the parameter space.
Fig. 3. Welfare with government commitment
13In the entry-prevention case, the home ®rm chooses a level of investment just suf®cient to
induce a subsidy that drives the foreign ®rm's pro®ts to zero. This does not mean that the home
®rm is actually a Stackelberg leader, although ( just as in the Brander-Spencer game) the
outcome is the one it would choose if it were. In the ®rst stage of the game, the entry-
preventing level of investment by the home ®rm and a zero level by the foreign ®rm are best
responses to each other. Welfare in the rent-shifting and entry-prevention regimes equals
W S  [1ÿ (2ÿ â)2ç]b(qS)2=2 and W S  [4(1ÿ â)2çÿ 1]=2(2ÿ 3â)2ç, respectively.
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Welfare is lower the more effective is R&D, though it falls less rapidly for
higher spillovers. This contrasts sharply with the entry-prevention regime,
which as in Game G is the dominant policy when R&D is highly effective
and spillovers are low. Welfare now increases rapidly in ç and declines
rapidly in â.14 Note that there is a wide range of parameters (high ç and
intermediate to high â) for which welfare is negative, often highly so. (Of
course, home pro®ts are always positive.) Comparing Figure 5 with Figures
1 and 2, the rent-shifting regime in Game S yields higher welfare than either
free trade or cooperation only for low values of ç, although if entry
prevention occurs, Game S may yield considerably higher welfare.
Fig. 4. Welfare with commitment relative to cooperation
14With no spillovers, the no-commitment case dominates free trade for low and high values of
ç but not for intermediate values: a U-shape also found by Grossman and Maggi (1998) but for
different reasons. In their model, only the home ®rm invests in R&D and when ç is high, the
extra subsidy-induced investment has a low social cost. In our symmetric model, the U-shape
re¯ects the higher welfare attainable with entry prevention when ç is high.
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The last issue we address is the size of the subsidies in the G and S
equilibria, shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. The relatively ¯at portion
of Figure 6 corresponds to the optimal rent-shifting subsidy in Game G.
Although the vertical scale masks its variation, it is a complicated function
of ç and â, re¯ecting the interaction of the different motives for subsidisation
implied by (12).15 However, all this variation is dwarfed by the contrast with,
®rst, the entry-prevention subsidy in Game G, which is typically much larger
and is strongly decreasing in both ç and â; and, second, the optimal subsidy
in both regimes of Game S shown in Figure 7. (Once again, extreme values
Fig. 5. Welfare without government commitment
15The optimal rent-shifting and entry-prevention subsidies in Game G are:
sG  [1ÿ
2
3
â(2ÿ â)ç]2
2[1ÿ 1
3
(2ÿ â)ç] ÿ
2
9
(1ÿ 2â)(2ÿ â)ç
( )
bqG, sG  1ÿ (1ÿ â)ç
1ÿ âç (aÿ c0):
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of the optimal subsidy have been truncated to facilitate viewing the ®gure.)
For all positive values of ç the optimal subsidy without commitment is
considerably greater than the corresponding subsidy with commitment. This
suggests that a simple device to avoid the welfare losses from an inability to
commit would be to place a ceiling on the subsidy rate or on the total amount
of subsidy payments.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper we have compared adversarial with cooperative industrial and
trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game where a home and a foreign ®rm
compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each bene®ts from
the other's R&D. We have shown that the choice between subsidising exports
and facilitating international research joint ventures depends on three key
features: the effectiveness of R&D in reducing costs, the extent of spillovers
Fig. 6. Optimal subsidy with commitment
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between ®rms, and whether or not the government can commit to an export
subsidy in advance of ®rms' investment decisions.
Concerning R&D cooperation, we show that it raises pro®ts and hence
(ignoring home consumption) raises domestic welfare for either high or low
spillovers. However, the reasons it does so differ between the two cases. With
low spillovers, each ®rm has an incentive to over-invest to give itself a
strategic advantage against its rival in subsequent product-market competi-
tion. Cooperation over-internalises this externality, serving in effect as an
anti-competitive device to restrict R&D and output, so world welfare falls
even as national welfare rises. By contrast, with high spillovers, each ®rm
faces an incentive to under-invest, since otherwise its rival will enjoy the
bene®ts of its cost-reducing investments. Cooperation again raises national
welfare but it leads to over-investment from a national point of view, to the
bene®t of foreign consumers.
As for an export subsidy, it typically yields modest welfare gains relative
Fig. 7. Optimal subsidy without commitment
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to R&D cooperation, provided the government can commit before R&D
decisions are taken. Figure 4 highlights two exceptions to this generalisation.
First, if R&D is very effective and spillovers are near-complete, R&D
cooperation is sure to raise welfare much more than subsidisation. Second, if
R&D is very effective but spillovers are low, the optimal policy is a subsidy
suf®ciently high to prevent the foreign ®rm from entering the market. In
such cases, the welfare gains from exploiting a monopoly position where
R&D greatly reduces costs exceed the bene®ts from cooperation. Of course,
such a policy would be vulnerable to pressures from international regulatory
bodies and to retaliation by foreign governments. Nevertheless the scale of
the potential welfare gains highlights the incentives which governments face
to engage in such predatory policies. The answer to the question posed in the
title of this paper is therefore that `` beat 'em'' is mildly better than `` join
'em'' but, if you can get away with it, `` kill 'em'' is best of all!
A key determinant of our results is the size of the spillover parameter â.
Empirical evidence, reviewed by Griliches (1992), suggests a relatively low
value of between 0.2 and 0.4, implying that adversarial strategies are likely
to be preferable to cooperative ones. On the other hand, many authors have
suggested that â should be viewed as a choice variable. Kamien et al. (1992)
go further and argue that information sharing will always ensure that
spillovers are complete (â  1) when cooperation occurs. Which of these
arguments dominates presumably depends on the particular industry to
which the model is applied. However, in all cases the caveat noted in Leahy
and Neary (1997) should be borne in mind: cooperation always raises pro®ts
relative to non-cooperation, so the relevant issue for policy is whether
cooperation should be prohibited rather than whether it should be encour-
aged.
The ®nal issue which our results address is the likelihood and size of the
welfare losses from strategic trade policy when the government cannot
commit to its subsidy before ®rms' investment decisions. Our simulations
show that the welfare losses from the resulting socially wasteful strategic
investments may indeed be substantial. However, they also point to two
quali®cations to this argument. First, if R&D is relatively effective and
spillovers are low, the home ®rm may be able to engage in a level of
investment which prevents the foreign ®rm from entering the market. The
surprising feature of this outcome is not that the existence of a strategic trade
policy programme leads to a monopoly position for the home ®rm even
when both ®rms are ex ante identical. Rather it is that the resulting
monopoly pro®ts may raise welfare above the level it would have reached
even with R&D cooperation. Second, whether the foreign ®rm enters or not,
the resulting optimal subsidy is many times greater than it would be if there
was no R&D and/or if the government could commit in advance. This
suggests that capping the level of subsidy payments may be a simple but
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effective way of avoiding the capture of subsidy programmes by domestic
®rms.
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